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1. INTRODUCTION 
 With the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq at the end of 2011, the reduction 
of international forces from Afghanistan, and the ongoing civil war in Syria, 
uncertainty remains whether democracy emerges post-conflict. The fragile nature of 
democracy in Iraq, the inability to foster democratic governance in Afghanistan, and 
calls for democratization in Syria, bring into question the efforts of the United States 
and its partners to build democratic systems in the aftermath of civil conflict. The 
literature on democratization suggests that the prospect of conflict encourages the 
emergence of democratic institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005). However, 
after a civil war, the likelihood of future conflict and political decay undoubtedly 
increases. Still, while “turnarounds” in failing states are rare, they are more likely to 
occur in a post-war environment (Chauvet and Collier 2009).   Our paper seeks to 
answer the question of whether democratic turn-arounds are more or less likely in a 
postwar environment.  That is, does the post-war environment set states on a more 
democratic trajectory than their non-warring counterparts?   
 This paper examines the influence of civil war on democratization. If civil war 
or the characteristics of its termination incentivize the emergence of democracy, then 
international institutions and parties to civil war are likely to have a keen interest in 
these incentives. Enhancing or attenuating these incentives may increase the 
likelihood of democratization. On the other hand, if civil war does not alter the 
likelihood of democratization, then this implies that the literature does not clearly 
portray the mechanisms of democratization. This finding would also suggest that 
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much of the current effort to foster democracy in conflict-prone regions is prone to 
failure. 
 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section briefly 
reviews the literature on democratization and develops several testable hypotheses. 
The third section describes the data and discusses the estimation methodology. The 
fourth section of the paper presents and considers the results. The last section 
concludes and discusses opportunities for future research. 
 
2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Civil war appears to be a development trap (Collier 2008; Collier and Hoeffler 
2004).  However, as such, theory suggests that democracy may arise as a 
compromise to prevent and settle wars. That it, the economic costs of conflict may 
encourage parties to democratize (Rosendorff 2001). There are good reasons that this 
might be an attractive political outcome: democracies may be attractive given their 
economic performance relative to autocracies over time (Gleditsch 2002). Democratic 
governance, while imperfect, is relatively efficient and effective when compared to 
other forms of governance (Sen 2000) and appears to be growth enhancing (Perotti 
1996).   
 Empirical literature examining post-war democratization has not clearly 
established the implications of war on democracy.  Fortna and Huang (2012) point 
out that post-war countries sometimes democratize and sometimes do not, but that 
countries that democratize post-war are much like those that would without a war.  
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This leaves open an important question: controlling for drivers of democracy, does 
civil war make a difference in democratization?   
Our first empirical question is whether the termination of a civil war affects 
democratization in the succeeding period? From the theoretical literature, we would 
hypothesize that, as in Chauvette and Collier’s (2009) work on failing states, war 
offers a unique opportunity to build new institutions that others may not possess.  
The theoretical literature postulates that civil war occurs because a democratic 
solution is untenable to the conflicting parties and that they are willing to bear the 
cost of war. War essentially substitutes for peaceful democratic competition 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2005). The termination of war suggests that the cost of war 
has grown too significant (resource exhaustion) or that one party triumphed over the 
other (military victory). The conclusion of civil war should create opportunities for 
reform.   
Beyond the question of whether civil war termination affects democratization, 
we desire to explore whether the conditions of termination affect democratization in 
the succeeding period.  The growing body of literature that analyzes pre-war v. post-
war outcomes considers many of these factors (e.g. Gurses and Mason 2008, Fortna 
and Huang 2012, Joshi 2010, DeRouen et al. 2010).  Using non-warring countries as a 
control to measure whether wars that end in certain ways make countries more 
democratic than their non-warring counterparts, we believe complements this line of 
research.  
 Our second empirical test is whether civil war duration affects 
democratization in the succeeeding period.  Thirdly we test whether a clear military 
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victory impacts democratization. Here we should observe two effects: that the 
extended duration of a civil war positively affects democratization in the succeeding 
period; and that a civil war ending with no clear victor positively affects 
democratization in the succeeding period.  Protracted conflicts may result in the 
realization that neither side is likely to prevail and that the benefits of peace 
outweigh the benefits of continued conflict (Jensen and Wantchekon 2004; 
Wantchekon 2004). Democratic governance is a potential method for sharing the 
benefits of ending a conflict; otherwise there would be an incentive for one or more 
of the parties to continue warfare. Wantchekon (2004) goes on to explain that 
“democracy will become the natural outcome of civil wars, provided that there is 
military stalemate and the factions are economically dependent on citizens’ 
productive investments."  A counterpoint to this idea comes from DeRouen and 
Bercovitch (2008) and DeRouen et al (2010): military victories appear to provide a 
more enduring peace and a result of negotiated settlements may be that suffer from 
enduring rivalries that promote continued conflict (DeRouen and Bercovitch 2008).   
Alternatively, wars may end in government or rebel victories, and one might 
want to believe that rebels, fighting for freedom from government oppression are 
more likely to democratize; however, it seems more likely that if either side wins a 
war it has incentives to consolidate power.  Empirical studies of post war samples 
have suggested that if a conflict ends with military victory, democratization is less 
likely to occur (Gurses and Mason 2008)  A rebel victory may lead to internal 
violence and oppression as rebels settle 'scores' and, often, are unprepared for the 
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tasks of governance. A victory by the government also reduces the incentive to 
liberalize society.  
Our last empirical question is whether UN invervention in a civil war affects 
post-war democratization?  When peacekeeping is part of ending a civil war, there is 
a possibility for greater state capacity and as a result a pathway to democratization.  
As with a stalemate, peacekeeping forces negotiations that may lead both sides to 
democratization.   There is a sizeable literature on the role of UN intervention and it 
produces mixed conclusions on its effectiveness at either building state capacity or 
creating lasting peace.  McBride, Milante, and Skaperdas (2011) suggest that 
outsiders can play a critical role in encouraging power sharing through investments 
in state capacity.  Put another way, external intervention may influence 
democratization by allowing for the formation of credible commitments (Fortna 
2004; Walter 2001). UN intervention appears to generate stable peace and democracy 
in “non-identity wars”(Doyle and Sambanis 2000). UN intervention may also 
accelerate the occurrence of democratic elections, although early elections may 
provide an incentive for the emergence of individuals and parties who favor a return 
to conflict (eg. Brancati and Snyder 2011; Hoddie and Hartzell 2010; Joshi 2010). This 
question is far from settled, however, as other studies have found that UN 
intervention has had no statistically significant impact on democratization (Fortna 
and Huang 2012) and that intervention can prolong war (Cronin 2010). Outsiders, 
either unwittingly, or because of conflicting objectives, also may undermine state 
capacity (McBride, Milante, and Skaperdas 2011).  
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In summary, there are arguments in the literature for the positive influence of 
civil war termination, duration, and the absence of a clear victor on democratization 
in the succeeding period. Rebel victory, on the other hand, is more likely to reduce 
democratization. There is also a lack of consensus on how UN intervention impacts 
democratization. It should not be surprising that the literature has not answered 
these questions, even though statements of policymakers would suggest that there is 
strong evidence for democratization following the conclusion of civil wars. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The choice of democracy index and empirical methodology may significantly 
influence the conclusions with respect to the emergence (or lack thereof) of 
democracy. Most papers employ either the Freedom House measures of civil 
liberties and political rights or the Polity IV democracy score, each of which employs 
a different strategy for measuring democracy and, as a result, contain measurement 
error. Some researchers use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) or Tobit estimators to 
argue that a variety of factors including resource rents and war characteristics, 
significantly influence democratization (Epstein et al. 2006; Fortna and Huang 2012; 
Ross 2001). These findings are subject to suspicion, however, due to the presence of 
country-specific effects and the persistence of democracy. When using a difference 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator to control for these country-
specific effects and the persistence of the democracy (and other) variables, factors 
such as education and income no longer appear to have a statistically significant 
influence on democratization (Acemoglu et al. 2005; Acemoglu et al. 2008) 
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More recently, an argument has emerged from the literature that, in small 
samples, the system GMM estimator is not only consistent with, but also relatively 
efficient compared to the difference GMM estimator when empirically investigating 
the determinants of democratization (see: Aslaksen 2010; Castelló-Climent 2008; 
Csordás and Ludwig 2011; Heid, Langer, and Larch 2012). These studies have found 
limited evidence for a statistically significant relationship between resource rents, 
education, economic growth, and democratization. We seek to build upon this 
empirical literature to examine the influence of civil war termination on 
democratization.  
 
3.1 Data and Model Specification 
One common problem in cross-country studies of democratization is how to 
properly measure democracy and transitions between regime types. 
Democratization is a complex process involving many public and private 
institutions and we readily acknowledge that any measure is likely to be imperfect. 
Ideally, we would construct a panel data set of civil and political institutions to 
effectively quantify the democratically oriented activities of society. This would 
demand not only significant knowledge about formal institutions but also informal 
institutions. Constructing such a panel data set would require information not only 
on the political, administrative, and fiscal operation of the central government but 
also on subnational governments. Unfortunately, we cannot readily address these 
issues with the available data. We are left with the standard, albeit imperfect, 
measures of democracy.  
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Several measures of democracy, not surprisingly, are available. The Freedom 
House, for example, constructs measures of civil and political rights, which many 
authors use to construct a composite measure of democracy.  More recently, the 
World Bank has created a composite measure of “voice and accountability” that uses 
the Freedom House measure, among others.  The Polity IV measure quantifies 
democratic and autocratic characteristics of governing institutions and subtracts the 
autocracy score from the democracy score for its composite index. Both of these 
measures, however, include violent conflict in their scores (it reduces democracy in 
both cases), which biases the measurement of democracy downward during conflict 
and upwards post-conflict. Unfortunately, the components of the Freedom House 
measures, and by extension the World Bank measure, are not readily available and 
we are unable to decompose these measures net of conflict. We can, however, 
examine the components of the Polity IV measures of democracy and autocracy. 
Two components of the Polity score contain conflict as a criterion (Vreeland 2008). 
We follow Vreeland, and subtract the Regulation of Participation and Competitiveness of 
Participation components of the democracy score as these measures include aspects 
of conflict. While Vreeland’s revised polity score is our preferred measure of 
democracy, to examine the robustness of our results to alternative specifications, we 
compare our revised measure of democracy to the Freedom House measure. 
With regards to the nature of the democracy data, we follow Treisman (2011) 
in arguing that democracy is ‘mostly continuous.’  The Polity IV and Freedom House 
data attempt to measure democracy across a range of possible outcomes, from the 
complete lack of democracy (freedom) to a completely democratic (free) society.  
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These measures are imperfect, however, we treat them as continuous variables for 
the sake of analysis.  Still, in section 3.7 we relax this assumption and use the 
Wooldridge (2005) method to treat these as count variables because of their integer 
values.   
To build our final data set, we include control variables from a variety of 
sources. We use data on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and economic openness (the 
sum of imports and exports as a share of GDP from the Penn World Tables (Heston, 
Summers, and Aten 2011). We obtain population and other socio-economic data 
from the World Development Indicators (2012). For consistency with the literature, 
we also include a measure of human capital using Barro and Lee’s education 
measure that takes the average number of years of schooling of the population over 
the age of 25. Finally, we construct a measure of natural resource rents as a share of 
GDP.1 
Data on conflict come largely from the Correlates of War dataset (Sarkees and 
Wayman 2010). The Correlates of War defines a civil war as between a government 
and one or more armed internal non-state groups and requires 1,000 battle related 
deaths per year to qualify for inclusion. They use these criteria to assign a date to 
conflict termination. Using this data, we are able to include the duration of a war, 
and the type of war termination experienced (Stalemate or Rebel Victory). We also 
build on Sambanis and Doyle’s (Doyle and Sambanis 2000) data set for UN 
intervention and add observations from the UN (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). Table 1 
defines the variables used in the empirical model and their sources. Tables 2 and 3 
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present descriptive statistics of these variables, the sample countries and time 
periods, respectively. 
For each country in the sample, we have potentially one observation for each 
of the sub-periods (1970-1974, 1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 
2000-2004). We use five-year periods because the annual data are noisy and we are 
concerned that using annual data may result in spurious correlations. Second, we 
seek to avoid short-term fluctuations and focus on changes in the variables across 
longer swaths of time (Fortna and Huang 2012). We also investigate whether the 
results are robust to alternative measures of democracy, estimators, control 
variables, and instrument count (see: Jensen and Wantchekon 2004; Roodman 2008; 
Wantchekon 2004). Combining the Polity data with data extracted from other 
sources results in a dataset of 620 observations. The final panel data set is 
unbalanced and covers 96 countries from 1970 to 2004.  
-Tables 1-3 here- 
 We define the dependent variable, Democracy, as the Polity IV score for 
democracy net of the Regulation of Participation and Competitiveness of Participation 
components of the democracy score. For robustness we define Democracy-Alternate as 
the Freedom House measure of democracy. Following the Correlates of War 
database (Sarkees and Wayman 2010), we define war as a dummy variable that is 
equal to one if a war starts or is ongoing in a period, 0 otherwise. The end of conflict 
(War End) is also a dummy variable, coded 1 if a war ends in the period and 0 
otherwise. Likewise, we create dummy variables to capture a rebel victory (Rebel 
Win), United Nations military intervention (U.N. Intervention), and a count variable 
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to capture the duration of the conflict in years at its conclusion (Duration). A matrix 
X of control variables includes population, population density, GDP per capita, 
natural resource endowments, and openness to international trade. (Gleditsch 2002; 
Levine and Renelt 1992).  
We employ the following estimation strategy to estimate the impact of civil war 
on democratization. 
Democracyi,t = α0 + β Democracyi,t-1 + τ w i,t-k + γX i,t-k + c i + λ t + u i,t  (1) 
where ci and λt denote the unobserved country and time effects. The subscripts i, k, 
and t denote country, lags, and time period, respectively. The binary indicator, w, 
indicates whether a war has ended. The coefficient τ captures the treament effect of 
interest. We assume that the error term, ui,t, follows a random walk. The error 
components’ specification accounts for time-invariant characteristics that may 
influence the development of democracy, to include colonial hertitage, geographic 
location, and cultural characteristics, among others. The specification also accounts 
for unobservable global trends that may also influence the development of 
democracy.  
 
3.2 Econometric Issues 
We began by examining whether the variables of interest exhibit a unit root 
process as the presence of a unit root, unless N and T grow large, is likely to induce 
inconsistent and biased estimates (Baltagi 2008). We employ the Fisher test to 
examine the null hypothesis that all the series are stationary versus the alternative 
that at least one series is stationary (Maddala and Wu 1999). We reject the null 
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hypothesis of non-stationarity for our measure of democracy and the 
macroeconomic independent variables at the 1% level of significance.2 
We first present results from pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and two-
way error components estimators. We note that the pooled OLS model explicitly 
assumes the country-specific effects are equal to zero and, in the presence of 
persistent effects, is inconsistent. If one suspects country or time specific effects 
impact the dependent variable, that is, country or time period characteristics impact 
democracy, then one can take these effects into account using error component 
estimators. We examine whether to employ a fixed or random effects error 
components estimator using a Hausman test and reject the null hypothesis of the 
exogeneity of the components and the regressors at the 1% level of significance.3  We 
thus conclude that the random effects GLS estimator is inconsistent and employ the 
less efficient, but consistent (under specific assumptions about the exogeneity of the 
policy instruments) Within or fixed effects estimator. In addition, using the fixed 
effects estimator, we reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity at the 1% level of 
significance.4  We reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation at the 1% level 
(Drukker 2003; Wooldridge 2001).5  Finally, we reject the null hypothesis that the 
individual and time-specific effects are jointly equal to zero at the 1% level of 
significance and thus employ the two-way Within estimator throughout the 
remainder of the paper.  
Within estimators, however, preclude the use of several time-invariant 
variables used in previous literature (Gassebner, Lamla, and Vreeland 2013). In 
addition, we must make caveats to employ the Within estimator. First, the policy 
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indicator (w) must be strictly exogenous to the uit, else the Within estimator is 
inconsistent. If the policy assignment changes in reaction to past outcomes on yit, 
then it violates strict exogeneity. In cases where wit = 1 whenever wir = 1 for r < t, 
strict exogeneity is usually a reasonable assumption; however, this implies that once 
a war begins, it does not end or, conversely, that when there is no war at time r, 
there is no war at time t. Our interest lies in those cases where war in time r is 
succeeded by an end to conflict at time t, that is, the cases of wit = 0 that are preceded 
by wir = 1. We are thus concerned that this treatment effect violates the strict 
exogeneity assumption, rendering the Within estimator inconsistent. We also note 
that the Within estimator may be biased and inconsistent in samples with large N 
and small T and the presence of a lagged dependent variable is mechanically 
correlated with the error term, violating its strict exogeneity (Perotti 1996).  
Accordingly, we are immediately confronted with significant econometric 
issues that, if left uncorrected, are likely to result in inconsistent and biased 
estimates. As democracy may slowly change over time, it is also probable that the 
current level of democracy is dependent upon the level of democracy in the previous 
period. While there are significant variations in the level of democracy across 
countries, democracy is relatively stable within countries. Of the 96 countries in the 
sample, 26 experienced no change in the level of democracy throughout their sample 
period.   The individual effects, characterizing the heterogeneity among countries, 
are a second source of persistence over time. Finally, we are concerned that some of 
the traditional determinants of democracy, including GDP per capita, are 
endogenous. Previous explorations of the determinants of democracy that do not 
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take these potential econometric issues into account are likely to be suspect, due to 
the inconsistent nature of their estimators. 
 Several instrument variable approaches are available to address systematic 
endogeneity, including using lags of the dependent variable as an explanatory 
variable. The Anderson-Hsiao Instrumental Variables (IV) estimator takes the first 
difference of all variables, then instruments for the first difference of the lagged 
dependent variable with the second lagged level of the dependent variable 
(Anderson and Hsiao 1982). This IV estimator is consistent but relatively inefficient 
in the presence of a lagged dependent variable and significant individual effects. The 
difference GMM estimator, on the other hand, is consistent, relatively more efficient 
than the IV estimator, and employs all available lagged levels of the dependent 
variable, beginning with the second lag, as instruments for the lagged difference of 
the dependent variable (Arellano and Bond 1991). We can also use the difference 
GMM estimator to treat regressors such as GDP per capita as endogenous, using 
second and deeper lagged levels of GDP as instruments for its first difference.  
The persistence in the levels of education, natural resources, and democracy 
may account for the insignificant relationships in much of the literature employing 
fixed effects and various difference estimators (Aslaksen 2010). The difference GMM 
estimator, however, may also be inefficient because levels may not be good 
instruments for differences. Differences may be a superior instrument for the levels 
(Roodman 2006). Therefore, in addition to the difference GMM estimator, we 
employ a system-GMM estimator that uses all available lagged differences as 
instruments for the lagged levels (Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell and Bond 
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1998). The short T and persistent series appear to support the extra moment 
conditions of the system GMM vice the difference GMM (Baltagi 2008). The system 
GMM estimator should thus produce dramatic efficiency gains over the difference 
GMM as the persistence effect of the dependent variable grows (Blundell and Bond 
1998). Finally, regardless of the GMM estimator’s form, GMM estimators offer 
standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.  
Researchers have several options available to them when using GMM 
estimators that incur important trade-offs. We report the results of several 
specifications, per Roodman’s (2008) advice, to ensure robustness to specification 
choices. Specifically, we can execute GMM using a one or two step process. The one-
step estimator provides estimated standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and 
serial correlation. The two-step process is generally more efficient and naturally 
resilient to heteroskedasticity but tends to downward bias standard errors enough to 
make inference impossible when instrument counts are large (Arellano and Bond 
1991). The two-step process with Windmeijer (Windmeijer 2000) corrected standard 
errors may ameliorate the problems with standard errors; we report this as well. 
We also explore the sensitivity of our results to changes in the set of 
instruments. Instrument proliferation can overfit endogenous variables and weaken 
Hansen tests.6 We collapse the instrument matrix and limit the number of lags to 
control for instrument proliferation (Roodman 2008). In some specifications, we 
employ forward orthogonal deviations which can preserve the size of a dataset with 
gaps, a problem encountered with our data, by using the future differences to 
instrument for past differences (Arellano and Bover 1995). For the purposes of this 
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paper, we present the unrestricted, one-step GMM estimates, the one-step estimates 
with collapsed instruments and a lag-limit of three, and the two-step estimates with 
collapsed, forward orthogonal instruments and a lag-limit of three.7 
This approach allows us to compare and contrast the unrestricted GMM 
estimates with the restricted GMM estimates.  The unrestricted model, by using all 
available lag lengths, allows for the possibility of deep lags influencing the current 
level of democracy.  The cost of using deep lags, however, is that number of 
instruments proliferates and an overfit of the endogenous variable(s).  We employ 
the Sargan test (for both the difference and system GMM estimators) and the 
Differences-in-Hansen test (for the system GMM estimator) to determine the 
appropriate restrictions, to include lag length, collapsing the instrument matrix, and 
using forward orthogonal deviations. 
Finally, we report the results of several standard tests employed to validate 
GMM estimates. We test the hypothesis that the error term is serially correlated in 
the first order and not serially correlated in the second order. We test the validity of 
the moment conditions by using the Sargan test and robustness of additional 
moment conditions with the Hansen difference test. We recognize that any one 
estimator may have flaws, however, by examining the hypotheses of interest across 
different estimators, we argue that our results are appropriately conditioned to these 
flaws. 
 
3.3 AR(1) specifications of democracy 
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We first regress democracy on its first period lag. While the OLS and Within 
Groups estimators are inconsistent, these estimators are likely to be biased in 
opposite directions and thus provide upper (OLS) and lower (Within Groups) 
bounds for the IV and GMM estimators (Bond 2002). If the estimated coefficient for 
the AR(1) model falls within these bounds, then we may proceed, with empirical 
evidence that the model is well specified. On the other hand, were the estimated 
coefficient on the supposedly consistent estimator to fall dramatically outside these 
bounds, one would suspect severe finite sample bias or inconsistency. We would, in 
this case, need to more rigorously test our underlying assumptions about the 
viability of the GMM estimators. Table 4 presents the AR(1) estimations of the 
democracy measure. 
We estimate a first-order autoregressive model with year-specific effects to 
account for common cross-country shocks to the democracy variable. The first two 
columns present estimates of ρ with heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. 
We reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation at the 1% level for the OLS and 
Within Groups estimators. The third column is the just identified, consistent, 
Anderson-Hsiao IV estimator. As expected, the OLS estimate forms a lower bound 
while the Within Groups estimate forms an upper bound. The IV estimate lies within 
these bounds. 
With regards to the GMM estimates, the unrestricted, one-step difference 
GMM estimate is within the expected bounds. We reject the null hypothesis of the 
Sargan test, however, suggesting that the model is over identified. When we restrict 
the lag-length on the instruments and collapse the instrument matrix, the estimate is 
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marginally above the OLS estimate of ρ. Using forward orthogonal deviations in 
conjunction with lag-length limits, a collapsed instrument matrix, and the 
Windmeijer correction produces a higher estimate of ρ. We suspect finite sample 
bias may make the difference GMM estimator inefficient. 
Turning to the system GMM estimator, the estimated coefficients for ρ are 
positive, lie within the established bounds, and are statistically significant at the 1% 
level. While we reject the null hypothesis of the Sargan test with the unrestricted, 
one-step estimator, suggesting the model is overidentified, constraining the 
instrument matrix appears to be an appropriate correction. We reject the null of 
exogeneity using the difference-in-Hansen test for the two-step system GMM 
estimator with a lag-limit of three and collapsed and orthogonal instruments.  
We thus have evidence to support our argument that the AR(1) model is well 
specified for the democracy series and the ranking of the OLS, Within Groups, and 
IV estimators is consistent with our a priori expectations. While the difference GMM 
estimator may be subject to finite sample bias, the system GMM estimator lies within 
the established bounds, regardless of restrictions on lag-length or the composition of 
the instrument matrix. These results suggest the system GMM estimator is most 
appropriate to test our hypotheses of interest; we will, however, continue to present 
the results of the other estimators for comparative purposes. 
- Table 4 here - 
 
3.4 Democracy and Termination of Civil Wars 
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 A priori, we would believe, on the basis of the literature and political 
statements, that the termination of a civil war is an opportunity for democracy to 
'flourish.'  We would expect a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between the termination of a civil war and democracy in the succeeding period. As 
before, we employ the OLS and Within Groups estimators to establish the bounds 
for the IV and GMM estimators (Table 5). 
 We find that the end of a civil war negatively impacts democracy in the 
succeeding five-year period. This relationship is consistent and statistically 
significant across the IV, difference GMM, and system GMM estimators. The 
relatively inefficient IV estimator suggests that the termination of a civil war in time 
t-1 leads to a decline in the democracy score by 3.35 in time t. The affect is similar in 
the difference GMM models, except in the most restrictive model (15). We fail to 
reject the null hypotheses of over-identification in the one-step model with collapsed 
instruments (14) and the fully restricted model (15). The estimated coefficient from 
the difference GMM estimators, particularly model (15), with a lag-limit of 3 and a 
collapsed, orthogonal instrument matrix, are however, well outside the upper bound 
established by the OLS estimator, suggesting again that the difference GMM 
estimator may not be appropriate to test the hypotheses in question. 
With regards to the system GMM estimator, we find that the termination of a 
civil war leads to a decline in the democracy score. The democracy score declines by 
approximately 2 in the unrestricted system GMM model (16) to approximately 1.32 
in the two-step estimator with three lags, collapsed instruments based on forward 
orthogonal deviations (18). The estimated coefficients for the system GMM model 
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are statistically significant at the 1% level, except for the two-step estimator, which is 
at 10%, most likely due to the downward biased standard errors. We fail to reject the 
null hypotheses that the moment conditions are valid and that instruments are 
exogenous in the one-step model with collapsed instruments (17) and the fully 
restricted model (18), suggesting that the unrestricted model (16) is overidentified.  
We thus conclude that the termination of civil war negatively impacts 
democracy in the succeeding period. Our results for this bivariate estimation are 
consistent whether we limit the instruments, collapse the instrument matrix, employ 
forward orthogonal deviations as instruments, or use the Windmeijer correction. 
These results suggest that there is a lack of empirical evidence for democracy 
flourishing after the conclusion of civil wars, and that, in practice, war termination 
often leads to a consolidation of power away from democracy.  
-Table 5 here- 
3.5 Robustness Checks 
 We now turn to the question of whether the estimated coefficient for the 
termination of civil war is robust to the inclusion of additional explanatory variables 
and changes in the set of instruments. Our set of conditioning variables includes per-
capita GDP, openness to international trade, population, natural resource rents as a 
and share of GDP, and average education.  
 We find, as with the bivariate regressions, that the termination of a civil war 
negatively affects democratization in the succeeding five-year period (Table 6). For 
the difference GMM estimators, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the moment 
conditions are valid for each of the models. The estimated coefficient for lagged 
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democracy is within expected bounds and the coefficient for civil war termination is 
statistically significant at 1% in the unrestricted model and 5% in the restricted 
models. The marginal effect of civil war termination for the difference GMM models 
with controls is slightly larger than the bivariate difference GMM models, with the 
termination of a civil war leading to reduction of approximately 3 points in the 
unrestricted model (21) to approximately 4.83 points for the fully restricted model 
(23).  
 For the system GMM estimator, we fail to reject the null hypotheses that the 
moment conditions are valid and that the instruments are exogenous for the one-
step (25) and two-step restricted models (26). We do reject the null hypothesis that 
the moment conditions are valid for the unrestricted model (24) and thus conclude 
that the unrestricted model is overidentified. The estimated coefficient for lagged 
democracy is within expected bounds and the coefficient for civil war termination is 
statistically significant at 1% for the restricted system GMM models. War 
termination leads to a decline in democracy by approximately 2 points in the 
succeeding period. 
 We also note that, in our preferred system GMM estimates, education appears 
to positively influence democratization, a result previously found in the literature. 
Education is significant at the 5% level (25) and at the 1% level (24, 26). The estimates 
for education, however, appear sensitive to the choice of estimator, as the estimated 
coefficients are insignificant for the IV and difference GMM estimators. 
 Finally, we find scant evidence to corroborate significant impacts from the 
control variables suggested in the literature. Our results cast doubt on the suggestion 
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that countries experiencing civil war democratize for the same reasons as those 
unaffected by civil war (Fortna and Huang 2012). Despite any impacts war may have 
on development, or that development may have on war, countries that have 
experienced war have lower subsequent levels of democratization.  
-Table 6 here- 
3.6 Characteristics of Civil War  
 The evidence to this point strongly suggests that the termination of a civil war 
leads to a decline in democracy in the succeeding period, although the magnitude of 
this effect depends on the choice of estimator and restrictions on instruments. 
Controlling for the end of civil war, we now explore whether the characteristics of its 
termination impact democratization in the succeeding period. We examine whether 
the duration of a civil war, whether the war ends with a stalemate, whether the 
rebels win the civil war, and whether the UN intervenes at the termination of the 
civil war have a significant impact on democratization. 
We present the estimates from the difference and system GMM estimators in 
Table 7. We continue to use the control variables presented in the previous section.8 
For the restricted difference GMM models (28, 29), the estimated coefficient for the 
end of a civil war is no longer statistically significant. We do find, however, that UN 
intervention is positive and statistically significant at the 1% (27, 28) and 5%(29) 
level. While duration appears to affect democratization, the result is fragile and 
becomes statistically insignificant in the fully restricted difference GMM model. 
Likewise, rebel victory appears to lower democratization in the succeeding period, 
although the estimated coefficient becomes insignificant in the most restrictive 
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model. The unrestricted difference GMM estimator (27) appears overidentified as we 
reject the null hypothesis that the moment conditions are appropriate. We again 
caution that the difference GMM estimator is likely to be less efficient than the 
system GMM estimator and may suffer from finite sample bias. 
Turning to the preferred system GMM estimators, the estimated coefficient 
for the termination of civil war is negative and, unlike the difference GMM 
estimator, statistically significant at the 5% level for all models. UN intervention is 
positive and statistically significant while rebel victory is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level in all models. Duration, on the other hand, appears to 
have a negative impact on democratization in the succeeding period although this 
result is fragile to restrictions on the instruments. We once again reject the null 
hypotheses of proper moment conditions and exogeneity of the instruments for the 
unrestricted model (30). For the restricted models (31, 32), we fail to reject these 
nulls, making these our preferred estimates.  
These results suggest that the conditions under which a civil war ends are 
important indicators of a country’s subsequent political development. The positive 
impact of UN intervention suggests that an outside party can serve to ameliorate the 
adverse effect of war termination on democratization. Rebel victories, however, 
appear to have a negative affect on democratization, suggesting that rebel 
movements are either unprepared for democratic governance or are using claims of 




3.7  Alternative measures of democracy 
 Next, we turn to the question of whether our measure of democracy 
influences the results above. We construct two alternative measures of democracy 
that range from 1979 to 2004. The first measure is the adjusted Polity IV democracy 
score. We derive the second measure from the Freedom House’s measures of civil 
liberties and political rights, and normalize both measures of democracy for 
comparability with 0 being a complete lack of democracy and 1 being completely 
democratic. We also constrain the data to the same samples for this test. We continue 
to caution that the Freedom House measure of democracy is biased by the inclusion 
of freedom from war as one of its criteria, and we are unable to ascertain the extent 
to which war affects the measures of civil liberties and political rights. This bias 
should lead to a positive bias in the post-war coefficient. For the discussion in this 
section, we only present the system GMM estimates given our previous concerns 
about the difference GMM estimator. 
 We first compare results of the bivariate estimations for the Normalized 
Polity and Freedom House scores. The estimated coefficients for the termination of 
civil war are negative and statistically significant in both models, although the 
coefficient for the Freedom House measure of democracy is biased upward, as 
expected. For the system GMM estimator with collapsed, orthogonal instruments 
and Windmeijer corrected standard errors, we reject the null hypothesis of the 
exogeneity of instruments for the Normalized Polity model but we fail to reject for 
the Freedom House model.  
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 For the fully specified models, we reject the null of proper moment conditions 
for the unrestricted models (35, 36) and proceed to estimate the most restricted 
models (37, 38). We fail to reject the null of proper moment conditions and 
instrument exogeneity for the restricted models.  
The estimated coefficient for the end of a civil war is negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% level in all models, continuing to support the previous results of 
a negative impact of civil war termination on democratization. UN intervention is 
positive and statistically significant at the 5% level in all models except the restricted 
Freedom House model. Rebel victory is insignificant in both restricted models, 
although it is negative and significant in both unrestricted models. The negative 
coefficients for the Freedom House model appear to be upward biased relative to the 
Normalized Polity model. 
3.8 Alternate dynamic specification 
 Considerable debate has arisen in the literature as to the appropriate way to 
measure Democracy. Bollen (1990), Przeworski et. al. (2000), Elkins (2000), Munck 
and Verkuilen (2002), among many others, argue whether democracy is discrete or 
continuous.  More recent discussion is whether democracy should be treated as 
dichotomous, ordinal, or continuous.  In order to address possible concerns, here we 
treat Democracy as discrete, and model it as a count variable.  We feel a dynamic 
model is the most appropriate of these kinds of models because the level of 
democracy is slow to change.  Thus, we have converted the POLITY data to non-
negative integers and have followed Wooldridge’s (2005) technique for estimating a 
dynamic count model. In addition to allowing integer values, Wooldridge’s model 
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controls for fixed effects by modelling them on initial conditions of independent 
variables.   
 Table 9 shows the results using this model, which generally support the same 
conclusions as our other models.  Specifically, lagged democracy is an important 
determinant of present democracy.  War termination significantly and negatively 
effects subsequent democracy.  UN intervention and stalemates both have 
significant positive impacts on subsequent democracy.  These results are all 
significant at the 1% level.   
 
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 The continuing discussion of intervention in Syria is couched in the language 
of freedom, democracy, and civil liberties. President Obama, in a meeting with the 
Emir of Qatar, stated that the two nations are seeking to remove Syrian President 
Bashar al-Assad and "strengthen an opposition that can bring about a democratic 
Syria that represents all people and respects their rights (Talev 2013)." UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon noted recently that, "The prospects may seem dim, but I 
remain convinced that a political solution is possible. This is the only way to end the 
bloodshed and bring about a new and democratic Syria” (Yan 2013). 
 We find scant evidence to support these policy statements. Instead, we find 
empirically robust evidence that the termination of a civil war negatively impacts 
democracy in the succeeding period. This evidence appears to be robust and 
statistically significant across a number of specifications, instrument sets, and 
measures of democracy. While many hope that the end of internal conflict will 
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promote the emergence of a democratic society, our findings suggest that the post-
conflict environment leads to more authoritarian regimes. Moreover, we find that it 
is unlikely that rebel victories will assure democratic transitions. Evidence suggests 
that rebels are more likely to undermine existing democratic institutions than to 
implement reforms. Supporting stalemates, not rebels, appears to be a better policy 
solution for promoting democratization.  
We do find evidence to suggest that external intervention, through the United 
Nations, may increase democratization in the succeeding period. This finding 
appears relatively robust. We argue that this appears to support the argument that 
outside intervention can promote democratization after a period of internal conflict, 
a situation where democratization is not otherwise likely. The parties may require an 
independent arbiter not only to separate them, but also to moderate discussion and 
the emergence of democracy.  
The findings in this paper suggest that further research is needed into the 
impact of civil war on institutions and into government capacity more broadly. 
Measures of institutional development, such as corruption and the rule of law may 
also be affected by civil war and may be equally important to democratic 
representation as long-run indicators of political well being. Moreover, our future 
research aims include investigating how post-war countries allocate expenditures in 
order to understand under what circumstances countries break out of the 
development trap that is civil war.  
A more difficult question is whether or not the termination of civil war is 
endogenous with respect to democratization.   If lower levels of democracy lead to 
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civil war, then does the onset of civil war lead to lower levels of democracy and 
longer war duration (or a lack of termination)?  As the onset and termination of civil 
wars are discrete events, this creates the question of how to approach a dynamic 
estimation of the influence of civil war termination on democratization.  Our initial 
evidence suggests that this question will be of increased interest in the future. 
Taken together, this paper’s findings suggest caution: merely negotiating a 
conclusion to civil war is insufficient to promote democracy. We find that successful 
rebellions are unlikely to lead to democracy despite their rhetoric. External 
intervention, and potentially stalemates at the end of conflict, appears to support the 
movement towards a more democratic and representative society. 
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Endnotes 
1 We obtained similar results examining rents as a share of population and excluding 
all but oil rents. These results are available upon request.  
2 We run the Fisher test without and with a trend variable for democracy, log of GDP, 
openness to international trade, and population, among others. Detailed test statistics are 
available upon request. 
3 Comparing a two-way random effects GLS estimator and a two-way Within 
estimator, we reject the null hypothesis that the differences in the two sets of 
estimated coefficients are not systematic with a Chi-squared test with 11 degrees of 
freedom and a resultant test statistic of 23.07.  
4 We employ a Breusch-Pagan test and reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity 
with a Chi-squared test with 1 degree of freedom and resultant test statistics of 13.95 
and 56.89 for the Within estimator without and with a lagged dependent variable, 
respectively.  
5 We employ the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in the panel data and reject the 
null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation with a F(1,87) test statistic of 39.802 
and 92.771 for the Within estimator without and with a lagged dependent variable, 
respectively.  
6 GMM estimators with too many moment conditions can be subject to overfitting 
biases in small samples (Bond 2002). We thus compare the unrestricted and 
restricted estimates and the loss of information from deep lags is thought to be 
minimal. 
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7 We also estimate the one-step GMM estimator with the lag-limits set to three or 
greater; the one-step GMM estimator with the lag-limits set to three, and the one-
step GMM estimator with collapsed, forward orthogonal instruments. These 
estimates are available upon request.  
8 The full results, including estimated coefficients and standard errors for the control 
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Variable Definition Units Source 
Democracy 
(Polity) 
The degree of openness of 
democratic institutions.  
-6 – 7 Polity IV with Vreeland (2008) 
modification.  
Population Natural log of population at start 
of period. 
 Penn World Tables 7.0  
Heston, Summers, Aten (2011) 
GDP Per Capita Natural log of purchasing power 
parity adjusted GDP per capita at 
the start of the period.  
 Penn World Tables 7.0 




Measured as the sum of exports 
and imports as a share of GDP 
 Penn World Tables 7.0 
Heston, Summers, Aten (2011) 
Education Measures the average number of 
years of schooling of the 
population over the age of 25.  
 www.barrolee.com 
Rents to GDP Measures the difference between 
the value of production of natural 
resources and total costs of 
production. This is a cumulative 
measure of oil, natural gas, 
mineral, coal, and forest rents.  
 World Development Indicators 
http://databank.worldbank.org 
 
War End Takes the value of 1 if a civil war 
ended during the period. 
0,1 Correlates of War 
Sarkees and Wayman (2010) 
Stalemate Takes the value of 1 if a civil war 
ended in a stalemate during the 
period.   
0,1 Correlates of War 
Sarkees and Wayman (2010) 
Rebel Victory Takes the value of 1 if a civil war 
ended in a rebel victory during 
the period.  
0,1 Correlates of War 
Sarkees and Wayman (2010) 
Duration Evaluated in the period the 
conflict ends; it takes on the 
number of years a conflict was 
ongoing.  
 Correlates of War 
Sarkees and Wayman (2010) 
U.N. Intervention This variable takes the value of 1 
if a war ended and there was UN 
intervention during the period.  










Series N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Democracy (Polity) 620 1.91 4.56 -6 7 
Population 620 45,397 141,628 455.15 1,300,000 
GDP Per Capita 620 7,760 9,080 345.97 44,813 
Openness to International Trade 620 64.74 44.33 5.31 412.16 
Rents to GDP 620 7.03 10.17 0 74.68 
Average Years School 510 5.26 3.027 0.23 13 
War End 620 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Duration 620 0.28 1.56 0 20 
U.N. Intervention 620 0.01 0.11 0 1 
Democracy (Freedom House) 533 0.55 0.32 0 1 







Country Years Country Years 
Algeria 1970-2004 Japan 1970-2004 
Argentina 1970-2004 Kenya* 1970-2004 
Australia* 1970-2004 Lesotho 1970-1999, 2005-2004 
Austria* 1970-2004 Madagascar 1970-2004 
Bangladesh 1975-2004 Malawi 1970-2004 
Belgium* 1970-2004 Malaysia 1970-2004 
Benin 1975-1989, 1999-2004 Mali 1970-2004 
Bolivia 1970-2004 Mauritania* 1970-2004 
Botswana 1970-2004 Mexico 1970-2004 
Brazil 1970-2004 Morocco 1970-2004 
Burkina Faso 1970-2004 Namibia* 1990-2004 
Burundi 1970-1994, 2000-2004 Nepal 1970-2004 
Cameroon 1970-2004 Netherlands* 1970-2004 
Canada* 1970-2004 Nicaragua 1970-1979, 1985-2004 
Central African Rep. 1970-2004 Niger  1970-2004 
Chad 1970-1979, 1985-2004 Nigeria 1970-2004 
Chile 1970-2004 Norway* 1970-2004 
China 1970-2004 Pakistan 1975-2004 
Colombia 1970-2004 Papua New Guinea* 1975-2004 
Congo 1970-2004 Paraguay 1970-2004 
Costa Rica* 1970-2004 Peru 1970-1999 
Cote d'Ivoire 1970-2004 Philippines 1970-2004 
Cuba* 1970-2004 Portugal 1970-1974, 1980-2004 
Dem. Rep. of the Congo* 1970-1994 Qatar 1975-2004 
Denmark* 1970-2004 Romania 1970-2004 
Dominican Rep. 1970-2004 Rwanda 1970-2004 
Ecuador 1970-2004 Senegal 1970-2004 
Egypt* 1970-2004 Sierra Leone 1970-1999 
El Salvador 1970-1979, 1985-2004 Singapore* 1970-2004 
Fiji 1970-1999 South Africa* 1970-2004 
Finland* 1970-2004 South Korea 1970-2004 
France 1970-2004 Spain 1970-1974, 1980-2004 
Gabon 1974-1989, 1999-2004 Sri Lanka 1970-2004 
Gambia 1970-1989, 1995-2004 Sudan 1975-1984, 1990-2004 
Germany* 1994-2004 Swaziland 1970-2004 
Ghana 1970-2004 Sweden* 1970-2004 
Greece 1970-2004 Syria 1970-2004 
Guatemala 1970-1984, 1990-2004 Thailand 1970-2004 
Guyana 1970-2004 Togo 1970-2004 
Haiti 1970-2004 Trinidad and Tobago* 1970-2004 
Honduras 1970-1979, 1985-2004 Tunisia 1970-2004 
Hungary 1970-2004 Turkey 1970-2004 
India 1970-2004 Uganda 1970-1984, 1990-2004 
Indonesia 1970-2004 United Kingdom* 1970-2004 
Iran 1970-1979, 1985-2004 United States* 1970-2004 
Ireland* 1970-2004 Uruguay 1970-2004 
Israel* 1970-2004 Venezuela 1970-2004 
Italy* 1970-2004 Zambia 1970-2004 
 




Estimates of the AR(1) specifications for Democracy 
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Observations 514 514 411 411 411 411 514 514 514 
Adjusted R2 0.698 0.283 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
M1 -2.608** 73.169** -4.732** -4.602** -2.762** -2.920** -4.544** -2.493** -2.964** 
M2 0.244 --- 1.568 1.490 1.426 1.462 1.557 1.325 1.448 
Lag Limits --- --- --- All 3 3 All 3 3 
Number of 
Instruments 
--- --- --- 20 7 7 26 9 9 
Collapsed / 
Orthogonal 
--- --- --- --- Collapsed Collapsed 
Orthogonal 
--- Collapsed Collapsed 
Orthogonal 
One step or Two --- --- --- One One Two One One Two 
Sargan test --- --- --- 38.217** 2.250 1.957 47.188** 2.912 3.635 
Diff. in Hansen test --- --- --- --- --- --- 3.307 1.654 3.061+ 
Notes:  Year dummies included in all models.  m1 and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1).  m1 test for 
Within estimator is the Wooldridge F-test.  The just-identified 2SLS estimator is for the equation in first differences, using democracyt-10 as the 
instrumenting variable. GMM results are one-step estimates with heteroskedastically-consistent standard errors and test statistics. Orthogonal is the 
forward orthogonal deviations transform instead of first differencing.  Sargan test is a test of overidentifying restrictions for the GMM estimators.   The 
difference-in-Hansen test is a test of the exogeneity of the instruments for the lagged democracy variable with the null hypothesis that the instruments are 
exogenous.  **,*,+ denote significance at the 1%,5%, and 10% level respectively.
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Table 4A  
(NOT FOR PUBLICATION)  
































Observations 411 411 411 514 514 514 
M1 -3.177** -2.762** -2.800** -2.844** -4.764** -2.545** 
M2 1.580 1.426 1.438 1.408 1.521 1.345 
Lag Limits 3 and 
greater 





15 12 7 20 12 9 
Collapsed / 
Orthogonal 
--- --- Collapsed 
Orthogonal 
--- --- Collapsed 
Orthogonal 
One or Two Step One One One One One One 
Sargan test 25.747** 15.074** 1.957 28.494** 2.912 3.635 
Diff. in Hansen 
test 
---  --- 2.331 1.654 3.061+ 





Democracy and War Termination 
 
 (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 






























































Observations 514 514 411 411 411 411 514 514 514 
Adjusted R2 0.710 0.300 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
M1 -2.223* 92.804** -4.763** -4.800** -2.964 -3.273 -4.518** -2.982** -3.232** 
M2 -0.132 --- 1.269 0.444 0.554 0.373 0.945 0.752 1.165 
Lag Limits --- --- --- All 3 3 All 3 3 
Number of 
Instruments 
--- --- 1 21 8 8 33 16 16 
Collapsed / 
Orthogonal 
--- --- --- --- Collapsed Collapsed 
Orthogonal 
--- Collapsed Collapsed 
Orthogonal 
One or Two Step --- --- --- One One Two One One Two 
Sargan test --- --- --- 35.561** 0.903 0.258 52.669** 9.181 9.989 
Diff. in Hansen 
test 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 3.271 0.433 1.880 
     Notes:  See Table 4.  **,*,+ denote significance at the 1%,5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 5a 
NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
Additional Estimates:  












































Observations 411 411 411 514 514 514 
M1 -3.293** -3.366** -3.049 -3.178** -3.156 -2.997** 
M2 0.463 0.509 0.333 0.856 0.817 0.916 
Lag Limits 3 and 
greater 





16 13 8 27 24 16 
Collapsed / 
Orthogonal 
--- --- Collapsed  
Orthogonal 
--- --- Collapsed 
Orthogonal 
One or Two Step One One One One One One 
Sargan test 26.376** 15.924** 0.258 38.602** 34.457** 9.989 
Diff. in Hansen 
test 
--- --- --- 4.906 4.366 1.880 




Democracy, War Termination, and Controls 
 (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) 






System    
GMM 
System    
GMM 

































































































































Observations 492 394 394 394 394 492 492 492 
Adjusted R2 0.742        
M1 -1.036 -3.753** -2.687** -2.693** -2.92** -4.149** -2.514* -3.014** 
M2 -0.171 0.401 0.530 0.436 0.16 0.534 0.415 0.527 
Lag Limits   All 3 3 All 3 3  
Number of 
Instruments  68 36 16 
 
95 27 27 
Collapsed/ 
Orthogonal 
   Collapsed 
Collapsed/ 
Orthogonal  Collapsed 
Collapsed/ 
Orthogonal 
One or Two Step   One One Two One One Two 
Sargan test  71.919 23.888 3.236 0.54 98.897+ 12.177 11.682 
Diff. in Hansen test      10.206 0.652 1.377 
Notes:  See Table 4. **,*,+ denote significance at the 1%,5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 6A -NOT FOR PUBLICATION  








System    
GMM 
System    
GMM 



































































































Observations 394 394 394 492 492 492 
Adjusted R2       
M1 -2.687** -2.695** -2.925** -2.869** -2.914** -2.694** 
M2 0.530 0.133 0.156 0.454 0.485 0.509 
Lag Limits 3 and greater 3 3 3 and greater 3 3 
Number of 
Instruments 36 16 16 71 59 27 
Collapsed / 
Orthogonal 
--- --- Collapsed 
Orthogonal 
--- --- Collapsed 
Orthogonal 
One or Two Step One One One One One One 
Sargan test 23.888 0.544 0.544 80.002* 69.524* 11.682 
Diff. in Hansen test    22.621 14.625 1.377 




Democracy, War Termination, and War Characterstics 






















































































Observations 317 394 394 492 492 492 
M1 -2.906** -2.103* -1.811* -3.962** -2.475** -2.947** 
M2 -1.184 0.160 -0.234 0.336 0.162 0.370 
Lag Limits All 3 3 All 3 3 
Number of Instruments 41 18 18 83 32 32 
Collapsed / 
Orthogonal 
--- Collapsed Collapsed 
Orthogonal 
--- Collapsed Collapsed 
Orthogonal 
One or Two Step One One Two One One Two 
Sargan test 38.251+ 4.957 3.363 89.826* 14.67 14.25 
Difference in Hansen test --- --- --- 24.353+ 0.171 1.112 
Notes:  See Table 4.  Controls include the log of GDP, population, openness to international trade, rents to GDP, and education.  The full and additional 








Table 8  
Alternative Measures of Democracy 
 (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) 








































































Observations 429 429 411 411 411 411 
M1 -2.883** -3.074** -2.807** -3.121** -1.846* -2.835** 
M2 -0.998 -0.080 -1.390 -1.309 -1.352 -1.132 
Lag Limits 3 3 3 3 3 3 







-- -- Collapsed   
Orthogonal 
Collapsed   
Orthogonal 
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
One or Two Step Two Two One One Two Two 
Sargan test 11.28 5.919 64.988** 44.074* 13.656 13.185 
Difference in Hansen test 6.862** 2.217 8.377 12.726 3.914 1.013 
Notes:  See Table 4.  Controls include the log of GDP, population, openness to international trade, rents to GDP, and education.  All estimations employ the System 






(39) (40) (41) (42) 
 
Polity Count Polity Count Polity Count Polity Count 














UN Intervention t-5 -- -- -- 0.47** 
(0.11) 
Stalemate t-5  -- -- -- 0.33** 
(0.10) 










Observations 709 709 559 559 
Number of Instruments 1 2 8 11 
Controls No No Yes Yes 
Notes:  See Table 4.  Controls include the log of GDP, population, openness to international trade, rents to GDP, and average years of schooling.  The full 
and additional estimations are available upon request. **,*,+ denote significance at the 1%,5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
